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FOREWORD 
The publication of these ECLA Cuadernos responds to a need 
which has been making itself felt for some time for a variety of 
reasons, chief among which has been the considerable demand for 
ECLA secretariat studies and documents which the usual distribu-
tion channels cannot adequately satisfy. 
Another reason has been the desire to complement current 
secretariat publications (which, because of their volume, do not 
usually lend themselves to wide distribution) with shorter and 
more flexible publications which allow a more lively and frequent 
dialogue with the Governments and public opinion of the region. 
Equally important has been the wish to make known the 
diversity of collective and individual works resulting from the 
daily work of the institution, which have normally not been 
included in the publications of the secretariat despite the fact 
that they deal with subject* of importance to the general public 
or to specialists in economic and social affairs. It is the aim of the 
Cuadernos to provide an adequate reflexion of the nuances and 
differences in technical approach which co-exist within the broad 
framework of institutional consensus. 
Finally, there is a lack of knowledge -sometimes relative, 
often considerable— about much of the work t,f international 
organizations. These new publications may do a great deal to shed 
light on what ECLA is doing in fulfilment of its mandate from its 
Member States. 
The first of these Cuadernos has special significance since it 
contains the speech given by the Executive Secretary of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America, Enrique V. Iglesias, at 
the most recent session of the Commission (Port of Spain, 6-15 
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May 1975). At that meeting, the Executive Secretary discussed 
the problems and tasks facing Latin America in the present period 
of adjustment of the international order, and drew attention to 
the "profound changes in the political, economic and social map 
inherited from the post-war period". His words form a fitting 
introduction to these new publications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This first meeting held by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America in an English-speaking Caribbean country is a truly 
valuable opportunity for EC LA to share at first hand, on the 
spot, in the life of this dynamic region. The Caribbean, while part 
of our America, is steeped in common historical, ethnic and 
cultural traditions which have given it its own identity, with a 
legitimate pride in its personality and a wealth of experience 
which must surely be an example to Latin America and the 
world. 
An integral part of its heritage has been the ability to amal-
gamate cultural groups with very different origins and social, 
economic and political situations under a single common denomi-
nator: the determination to harmonize efforts in the economic 
and social fields. Caribbean integration is a stimulus to us all. The 
process of co-operation initiated in Latin America is only a 
beginning, and it is most rewarding to be able to contemplate 
from within this dynamic process of change. The Caribbean drive 
for integration, which has appeared at an early stage in the 
process of independence of its countries, should be viewed with 
respect and admiration. 
The current trends towards greater concentration of the 
decision-making processes, the reorientation of values and institu-
tions, and more genuine and meaningful popular participation 
suggest new directions and a new climate of co-operation and basic 
discipline for tackling the major goals of development, which will 
strengthen the spirit of regional unity. This meeting should also 
enable us to become better acquainted and lead to a closer link 
between the countries of the Caribbean and the rest of Latin 
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America. And if, in addition, it gives rise to firmer co-operation 
among our peoples, EC LA will have amply fulfilled its essential 
task in its regional role as universal forum for Latin America and 
meeting-place of peoples joined together by common aspirations 
for internal and outward unity. 
Allow me now to present a summary of the secretariat's 
thinking and to indicate some fundamental ideas and preoccupa-
tions of which we have become conscious in our privileged 
position as observers of all the countries of the region and, at the 
same time, active members of the world organization, with con-
crete commitments in all fields and towards all the basic problems 
of economic relations. 
I shall do this by answering the following questions: 
(a) Are we facing a far-reaching structural turning-point in 
international economic relations? 
(b) What is Latin America's position vis-à-vis present world 
economic trends? 
(c) What are thé great problems which the marked develop-
ment of productive forces in the region in recent years has 
been unable to solve? 
(d) How do we in EC LA see the outline of a possible economic 
and social strategy for Latin America for the next few 
years? and, finally, 
(e) What are the urgent problems before us, and what basic 
ideas could be explored to tackle them in an effort aimed at 
co-operation within the region and between Latin America 
and the rest of the world? 
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I 
TIMES OF GREAT CHANGE: 
A TURNING POINT FOR HUMANITY? 
For a number of years, profound changes have been occurring in 
the political, social and economic map inherited from the post-
war period. These transformations have been accompanied by 
crisis in the economic institutions which are of primary impor-
tance in international relations, and there is much searching into 
the past and projecting into the future to announce changes 
—sometimes of a downright alarmist nature— of a great signifi-
cance for the destiny of mankind. 
Are we really at a turning-point in the evolution of contempo-
rary society, or is it merely a new transitors development, after 
which things will return to their former state? 
We believe in the former more than in the latter. In the first 
place, the attempt to patch up the former international economic 
order by trying to revive the Bretton Woods agreement is clearly 
breaking down. The crisis in the international monetary system is 
perhaps the most conspicuous example, but it is not the only one. 
This collapse of some of the institutions which have governed 
post-war international relations has been accompanied in recent 
years by economic crises in the central countries with which we 
are all familiar. 
At present, the most noteworthy elements of the crisis in the 
capitalist world are, inter alia, a serious inflationary crisis, a great 
drop in production and high levels of unemployment, all of which 
interact with each other. In addition to all this, there has been the 
dramatic change in the structure of the balance of payments of 
the central economies brought about by the changes in the world 
price of petroleum. 
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Inflationary trends have recently risen sharply in the industri-
alized countries. The rise in prices was approximately 3 per cent 
throughout the 1960s, but it increased to 6 per cent in the first 
years of this decade and reached approximately 15 per cent in 
1974. Even though promising signs of a drop in inflation are now 
appearing, inflation in the countries belonging to the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) will 
not fall below double figures in the present year. 
Inflation, which exceeds the limits considered "tolerable" in 
the centres, has acquired a very unusual nature because of its 
persistence and its resistance to conventional remedies. 
The reasons for this are debatable. The old internal and exter-
nal disequilibria in the central economies are well-known and 
have been pointed out repeatedly. They were recently com-
pounded by the increase in the price of raw materials and food 
because of economic and climatic circumstances. The rise in the 
price of oil from the depressed levels of recent decades abruptly 
halted the subsidizing of domestic energy costs. This whole 
complex of factors may explain, entirely or in part, the inflation-
ary crisis in the centres. 
However, inflation did not come alone. It was accompanied by 
a sharp recession in all OECD countries. In 1974 growth in those 
countries was negative and something similar seems to be taking 
place in 1975. Stagnation and inflation are a somewhat unusual 
combination according to previous experience of the economic 
cycles of the centres, and equally unusual is their resistance to the 
conventional policies applied in the post-war period. Some recent 
forecasts are less pessimistic and even predict an upswing in the 
productive cycle by the end of the year. However, unemployment 
forecasts are not as optimistic; and in any event the problem 
12 
varies, and the situation is not the same in each of the OECD 
countries. 
The deterioration in the balance-of-payments situation in the 
main centres is no Less acute. It is calculated that in 1974 their 
deficit exceeded 35 billion dollars. With this deficit there was also 
a change in the traditional balance-of-payments structure of the 
industrial countries. In the past, those centres enjoyed large 
current account surpluses with which they financed their foreign 
investment and international co-operation. But these surpluses 
have disappeared now, for the time being at least, wilt the result 
that the management of capital movements is much more diffi-
cult and the economic situation much more insecure. 
Despite the spectacular progress of the capitalist world in 
recent decades, there are signs that some of the dynamic forces 
behind structural change and economic growth are becoming 
exhausted. The changes in the basic cost of energy -abundantly 
used by the industrial economies hitherto— technological ambiva-
lence and the disequilibrium caused by manpower shortages fol-
lowing the absorption of most of the surplus rural population 
account in part for the disruption of the production model and 
the expansion mechanisms of the industrial world. 
The concept of sustained g-owth and expansion of production 
at any cost is being overtaken by events. Eyes are turning towards 
qualitative rather than quantitative, wasteful consumption pat-
terns are being criticized, and it objective is beginning to be felt 
that limits should be set on the indiscriminate incorporation of 
new technology. New criteria for economizing resources raise 
serious questions about alternatives to the "growth rate" and 
"consumption of resources", which have never before been asked' 
with such intensity. — 
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Thus, some changes are slowly occurring in the styles of 
growth in the centres, based on new policies for the use of 
resources and on the application of technologies to save energy 
and resources. 
The so-called "energy crisis" is of course a case in point. 
Policies to find energy substitutes will discover new resources 
which by all accounts will be much more costly than those 
prevailing in the 1960s. 
However, these are not the only structural changes which 
concern us. Very important events are occurring in the economic 
relations between the West and the East, which will have an effect 
on our own relationship with the developed world. 
Both centres, capitalist and socialist, have seen the advantages 
of greater economic co-operation and, despite possible fluctua-
tions, this co-operation will tend to be strengthened according to 
a policy of diversification and consolidation of supplies of raw 
materials and an exchange of mutually profitable technology. 
In sum, all these changes in the centres amount to something 
more than temporary crisis stemming from inflation and stagna-
tion. They point to a "type" of growth in the post-war period in the 
capitalist and in the socialist world. A period concerned with 
"better" rather than with "greater" growth seems to be dawning. 
In these times of growing interdependence, the underdeveloped 
world, and most particularly Latin America, cannot ignore these 
tendencies or fail to analyse every aspect of them which may 
affect the international relations of recent decades. 
In the circumstances, it would not be rash to suppose that in 
the centres there will be a rather lower growth-rate than in recent 
decades as a result of all these changes. Growing and sustained 
expansion in the centres no longer seems to be a reliable working 
hypothesis on which to plan our development policies. 
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What to these changes in the central economies signify for the 
international relations of the peripheral countries? Careful 
thought must be given to the answer to this question. 
According to the foregoing, the international setting of our 
foreign relations is changing, and it is important to know what 
those changes are in order to plan our internal development 
strategies. 
Above all, after a long period of stability in international 
relations, a period of instability and general insecurity is foreseen. 
Authoritative international bodies predict that —unless something 
is done to prevent this— the purchasing power of primary pro-
ducers will fall by 13 per cent in 1975 and, what is even worse, if 
the trend continues the terms of trade will fall at an annual rate 
of 2.2 per cent for the rest of this decade. If this is the case, then 
with the exception of the oil-exporting countries, and perhaps of 
sporadic temporary surges in the price of some raw materials, we 
will have before us a period of sharp deterioration in the terms of 
trade, unless we do something to avoid it. 
Secondly, from a climate of permanent expansion we will pass 
to a period of contraction, or at least of much more moderate 
growth than the spectacular rate achieved by the industrial 
centres in recent years. In the face of fluctuating international 
demand, Latin America's open, growth-oriented strategy may run 
into difficulties such as have recently affected our meat-exporting 
countries, which are suffering from restrictions and the loss of 
markets vital to maintain their rate of economic growth. 
Thirdly, it is not surprising that, despite well-intentioned opin-
ions in the developed world, there is a renewal of protectionist 
tendencies in trade, which at one time were thought to have died 
out. This is today a source of greater concern than in the past, 
since Latin America now exports 8 billion dollars, worth of 
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industrial products and could export much more. Possibly new 
forms of verticalization of economic relations between North and 
South may appear, which the generalized systems of preferences 
were intended to abolish. 
Fourthly, all schemes for financial assistance to the developing 
world are either in crisis or being revised. It is no longer merely a 
question of demanding fulfilment of the target of 0.7 per cent for 
the official transfer of resources, which has by no means been 
attained. 
There is great disappointment in the industrial countries, and 
no less frustration in the Third World countries, in regard to 
foreign aid, which fell by 2 per cent in real terms in 1974 in the 
Development Assistance Committee countries and which, accord-
ing to the same international sources, will be likely to fall from 
0.38 per cent of the product in 1973-1974 to 0.29 per cent in 
1980. 
Furthermore, the plight of the relatively least economically 
developed countries —few of which are in Latin America, accord-
ing to the international classification— absorbs and may well 
continue to absorb an ever-increasing part of this shrunken aid, 
thus further reducing the volume of concessional aid on which 
Latin America can rely. 
Fifthly, the vigorous flows of private capital to Latin America 
in recent years may not continue at the same rate or may be 
concentrated in a few of the most attractive countries. The 
foreseeable deterioration in the terms of trade and its effects on 
the balance of payments of the region may reduce the debt 
capacity of many countries, and as a result the private capital 
flows will become much more selective and sensitive to the new 
balance-of-payments crisis. 
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This account of the immediate outlook should not lead us to 
excessive pessimism about the international situation, but rather 
to a realistic approach which will guard us against merely extrapo-
lating from past circumstances which may not reoccur. In any 
event, it should lead us to meditate on the changes in attitudes 
and policies which the persistence of the crisis in the centres 
might bring about. 
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II. 
THE NEW STATURE AND PROFILE OF LATIN AMERICA: 
THE DEPLOYMENT AND EXPANSION OF ITS PRODUCTIVE 
FORCES IN THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 
Latin America is in a very different and unquestionably more 
favourable situation than in the past to meet the new situation. 
Very many Latin Americans —perhaps the majority— fail to 
appreciate the profound changes which have taken place in this 
respect in the last 25 years. The transformations have been 
substantial, both in size and in structure. Let us call to mind a 
few representative figures in passing. 
Around 1950 the total product of Latin America (measured in 
1970 dollars, like the other examples given here) amounted to 
some 60 billions dollars. In 1974, it came to 220 billion dollars: 
almost 4 times the size of the regional economy in 1950. 
What does this mean? On the one hand, that present total 
production is comparable to European production in 1950, when 
that region was already one of the most industrialized in the 
world and some of its larger countries were among the major 
economic powers. Despite the structural differences which 
obviously exist between the two types of production, it must be 
recalled that this was the basis upon which a group of countries 
carried out its dynamic and fruitful experiment in integration. 
Furthermore, the biggest economies in Latin America are now 
similar in size to the main European economies in 1950. 
Let us also look to the future and see what can and should 
happen if the rate of Latin American development of recent years 
continues for another ten years. Given the present situation and 
outlook, we may calculate that by 1985 the size of the Latin 
American economy will be more than seven and half times that of 
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1950, and double its present size. In comparative terms, it will 
reach more or less the size of the European Economic Comunity 
in 1960. 
To evaluate the structural transformation which such changes 
represent, let us examine what has happened to some key 
factors. The value of manufacturing production, for example, in 
1950 amounted to some 11 billion dollars. In 1974 it was almost 
five times higher. Its share of the total product rose from 18 per 
cent in 1950 to 24 per cent in 1974. Industrial exports in 1950 
represented 6 per cent of total exports and were limited to a few 
specialized products. In 1974, however, they accounted for 18 
per cent of export earnings and covered a wide range of manufac-
tures. 
Looking at the situation 10 years hence, it may be assumed 
that manufacturing production will be about eleven times greater 
than in 1950 and will represent 27 per cent of the total product. 
In other words, at current rates of growth, the increment of a 
single year at the end of the next decade will be comparable to 
the total production in 1950. 
Let us now look at investment. Its share of the total product 
rose to 23.5 per cent in 1974. If it continues to rise in this way 
until 1985, the entire capital stock of Latin Américain 1950 can 
be created in approximately one year and a half. In other words, 
another economy, of a size similar to that existing in 1950, could 
be reproduced in that amount of time. 
EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS OF SOME DYNAMIC SECTORS 
If we narrow our field of vision and look at the behaviour of 
some basic sectors of the productive system —which have been 
and will be in the near future the main sources of its dynamism— 
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we find the same combination of profound change and auspicious 
prospects. One aspect which must be taken into account in this 
brief survey is the change in the figures for certain significant 
items of production in the region, which in themselves reveal the 
growth in production, and also, for reasons which we will give 
later, the changes in imports from outside the area. 
First, let us examine what happened to production in the 
quarter of a century between 1950 and 1975 in specific sectors, 
as well as what might occur by 1985 if recent trends continue. 
• Steel production, the symbol of industrial capacity, grew over 
15 fold in those 25 years, and will reach 22 million tons in 
1985. 
• Energy production increased eight-fold and cement more than 
six-fold. 
• Motor vehicle production, which was almost insignificant, now 
exceeds 1.6 million vehicles per year. 
• Production of plant and machinery has risen almost nine-fold. 
Imports are still high, but for some years there has been a 
considerable flow of exports. The region has become self-
sufficient in durable goods, so that if present trends continue 
there will be an extremely promising outlook for these 
products. 
• Finally, let us take the traditional sectors: food, textiles and 
clothing. Here, production grew more rapidly than population, 
but at lower rates than in the more dynamic sectors mentioned 
above, so the relative importance of these sectors fell substan-
tially. This would seem to indicate two things: that there is 
large installed capacity and potential to expand production of 
light consumer goods to meet higher demand from the Latin 
American general public, and that, given the rates of growth of 
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the more dynamic sectors, the chances of real structural prog-
ress in Latin American industry are very great. 
This progress in the Latin American economy has a number of 
limitations which cannot be overlooked. The first and most 
important, no doubt, is that this process of great expansion took 
place in the context of an expanding world economy, particularly 
in the developed world. 
This does not detract from the region's merit in achieving such 
rapid progress —greater by far than that of other developing 
regions— but it should alert us to the difficulty of maintaining 
this rate of growth if world expansion is declining. 
The second and equally important limitation, of a domestic 
nature, is that this expansion of the productive forces in Latin 
America was economically very unbalanced, and the external 
sector remained very vulnerable, although protected in recent 
years by the exceptionally favourable balance-of-payments posi-
tion due to the high prices of certain primary products and the 
vigorous growth and diversification of non-traditional exports. 
What must really be emphasized is the existence in Latin 
America of an enormous growth potential, stemming from its 
experience and the capital, resources and technology available, 
and also from the "critical mass" of the size of the market and 
production in Latin America, which enables industrial ventures to 
be embarked upon which would have been impossible given the 
state of those factors in the past. This presupposes the integra-
tion of markets so that full advantage can be taken of the 
"critical mass". 
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THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF LATIN AMERICA TO THE 
CENTRAL ECONOMIES AS AN IMPORTER 
The other aspect of the great changes which have taken place in 
the size and structure of the regional economy is its growing 
importance as an importer of inputs and equipment from the 
central countries, Le., of the necessary ingredients for its own 
diversification, which are at the same time one of the main 
channels for the transmission of technological progress. 
At first sight, it might seem strange that this point should be 
stressed after the emphasis placed above on the extent to which 
the level of regional self-sufficiency in various basic sectors has 
risen. There is no contradiction between these two points, how-
ever. What is more, the fact that they are both valid shows that 
internal development and diversification -generically sometimes 
called substitution industrialization— is neither in intention nor in 
fact a trend towards national or regional autarky or towards the 
underestimation of foreign relations in terms of exports or 
imports. 
On the contrary, internal development and diversification at 
both the national and regional levels, far from signifying any kind 
of isolation, implies greater integration in the world economy. It 
does, however, on other grounds and in another context, reject 
what EC LA has called the former order of the international 
division of labour in favour of a different model of external 
integration stemming precisely from the structural transformation 
of the Latin American economies. 
The importance of dynamic industrial and non-traditional 
exports in this process of external readjustment is well known. 
What must happen as regards the volumes and composition of 
imports, from the central countries is also clear. Both flows must 
grow and change with time, in the appropriate direction. 
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What we wish to point out now is that this continuously 
increasing demand for inputs —which is one of the great problems 
to be solved now and in the future— also represents inestimable 
negotiating power whose value is not always fully recognized in 
transactions with the economies which supply the region. 
The importance and potential of the situation may be judged 
from some figures taken from recent EC LA studies. For exports 
of capital goods, consumer durables and chemical products from 
the United States, Latin America is a market three times bigger 
than Japan and almost as big as the European Economic Commu-
nity. 
For European sales of the same products, Latin America is 
equal to three-quarters of the United States market and it is more 
than four times the size of the Japanese market. 
Exports to Latin America of such goods from the United 
States, the EEC and Japan together amounted to 11 billion 
dollars in 1973. 
This means that, thanks to the expansion achieved by the 
Latin American economy and its openness to foreign trade, the 
region is today a major purchasing power in the developed mar-
kets, and therefore its capacity to act and negotiate is a valuable 
element which should not be overlooked in the future regional 
economic development strategy. 
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III 
THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM 
THE GREAT SOCIAL CONTRADICTION: SOMETHING L I K E A THIRD 
OF THE POPULATION O F LATIN AMERICA IS STILL EXCLUDED 
FROM THE BENEFITS OF EXPANSION 
All that has been said above is tangible evidence of the extra-
ordinary development of the productive forces of the region over 
the last quarter of a century. 
However, it should not be thought that we are ignoring one 
aspect which casts a dramatic shadow on these achievements and 
prospects: namely, the fact that a major part of the Latin 
American population has not been able to take part in that 
process, either as an active element of change or as a beneficiary 
of the advances won by other groups. In contrast, the high-
income groups have been able to copy and enjoy consumer 
patterns which the industrialized nations took a long time to 
reach, and then only after much higher average incomes had 
become the norm. 
This is the world of massive, critical poverty, of the under-
privileged and the destitute. This is the negative balance of 
growth, the reality which is tugging at the "critical conscience" of 
the region. 
Of the increase of 100 dollars in the average per capita income 
during the 1960s, only two dollars reached the poorest twenty 
per cent of the population. This is clear enough proof that we 
cannot be proud about what has been happening in the distribu-
tion of the benefits of progress. Today there are rather more than 
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300 mfllion Latin Americans. Of that number, about 100 million 
live in extreme poverty, and of these, some 65 mfllion are in rural 
areas, cut off from markets and lacking even the minimal culture 
which would enable them to glimpse the possibilities of a differ-
ent way of life from that which they have followed for genera-
tions. 
Broad groups of the Latin American population are com-
pletely marginal for ethnic and cultural reasons, and great efforts 
must be made to integrate them into society. Those that have 
come to the city, for their part, although they have received some 
of the leftovers of the benefits of modern society, have for the 
most part been relegated to belts of poverty which contrast 
sharply with the luxury of the major urban centres that have 
grown up over the length and breadth of Latin America. 
These figures, impressive as they are in themselves, become 
even more significant if one stops to think what it means to be 
extremely poor. To be extremely poor in Latin America means 
not having the food necessary for a family to develop normally. It 
means children suffering from malnutrition and condemned from 
childhood —if they survive, that is— to a position of inferiority 
for the rest of their lives. It means not having access to elemen-
tary education or, at most, completing the first years of primary 
education only to become illiterate later through lack of practice. 
It means having no health protection and thus being vulnerable to 
disease and early death. It means living in unhealthy, over-
crowded dwellings in the worst kind of promiscuity. It means 
being doomed to unemployment or being able to choose only the 
menial, temporary and lowest-paid jobs. In other words, it means 
being on the sidelines of the material and spiritual wealth modern 
society provides. 
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All this, of course, is not the result of lack of resources. Latin 
America has the human and material means to palliate critical 
poverty within a reasonable period of time. But we must recog-
nize that there has not been the political will to challenge with 
daring and imagination a state of affairs which prevents the 
creation of the conditions of solidarity needed to achieve just and 
sustained progress. 
Extreme poverty is an immutable problem: that is, all the 
characteristics mentioned above are found in families living under 
conditions of critical poverty. Moreover, it is a vicious circle, 
because anyone who has lived in extreme poverty generally crea-
tes a new family in which the deficiencies suffered by him and his 
forbears are passed on. 
Despite the fact that critical poverty has been a cause for 
concern for humanitarian, political and economic reasons in most 
countries of the region, we must recognize that very little has yet 
been done to speed up its eradication. 
We think that one of the reasons for the meagre progress so far 
made lies in the fact that there has not yet been sufficient study 
of the special characteristics of the problem, which has so far 
been approached with traditional instruments that, in practice, 
have proved ineffectual. 
For example, about half the extremely poor population is 
under 20 years of age. A good many children of school age either 
do not attend school or drop out prematurely. This problem has 
not been resolved even in countries where the education service 
has expanded significantly, thus showing that there.are problems 
specific to extremely poor children which prevent them from 
availing themselves of the education service. These problems may 
be due to considerations of economy, motivation, or the family, 
etc., but at all events they require a solution specific to this social 
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group. Otherwise, the effort that the community is making to 
broaden educational opportunities does not benefit those whose 
most need it in order to emerge from their poverty. 
This example can also be applied to the housing problem, to 
job opportunities and even to aspects of the provision of goods 
and services and the prices charged for them to the poorest 
communities. 
Progress has been made in labour and social security legisla-
tion, but only exceptionally has such progress benefited the men 
and women living under conditions of critical poverty, since they 
are often not on any permanent payroll, are not covered by any 
social security scheme, and have no organization to defend the 
rights theoretically enjoyed by them under the law. 
To sum up, the problem of extreme poverty requires urgent 
attention. A hundred million Latin Americans live in conditions 
that should arouse shame and concern among those of us who 
belong to the relatively privileged remaining two hundred million, 
because a society with such a deep division cannot go forward in 
peace and harmony; because such a state of affairs represents a 
waste of human ability and economic potential which could give 
new impetus to our economies; and finally, because our human 
and material resources are more than sufficient to feed, educate, 
protect and employ those who today do not have the minimum 
that society can and must offer them. 
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III 
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
SOME BROAD LINES FOR A LATIN AMERICAN STRATEGY 
The ideas, expressed above raise some major questions about 
future action in Latin America which apply to almost every 
country, despite their differences, although, of course, with dif-
ferent nuances and emphasis. These questions could be placed on 
three levels, according to the relative weight of internal or 
external circumstances on national decisions in each case. 
In the first place, there is concern and disagreement in the 
individual countries on account of the contradiction between the 
obvious development of productive potential and the persistence 
of the unsatisfactory living conditions of large segments of the 
population. Concern is naturally greatest where the differences 
are most extreme. 
Secondly, in view of the changing international scene, the 
desire to establish deeper and wider intra-regional co-operation is 
gaining force, both as a means of continuing the changes in the 
structure and size of the Latin American economy and as a 
creative approach to the international situation. 
Thirdly, there are signs of efforts to find a new place for each 
country and for the region as a whole in the newly emerging 
international situation, nebulous and uncertain though this still is. 
It is superfluous to point out that we do not have answers to 
these problems, and it would be audacious —and even a piece of 
effrontery— to claim that we had. 
However, EC LA'S role and practical experience enables us to 
assemble some basic ideas which appear to have been emerging 
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from major decision-making groups and circles in Latin America, 
although of course this overall view may not correspond to 
certain individual views. 
1. 
IS ABJECT POVERTY AN ANACHRONISM? 
In the light of the foregoing it seems clear that the level of 
development reached by the region ought to enable it to make 
substantial progress in reducing, if not totally eradicating, the 
problem of abject poverty within a reasonable time, although, of 
course, not immediately. This, by the way, is one of the most 
obvious differences with respect to other areas of the periphery. 
Once again, it is clear that we are dealing with different 
national situations. The countries best placed to take up this 
challenge are also those which face the problem under less critical 
circumstances. This does- not invalidate the general argument, 
however. It only means that the lengths of time needed will vary, 
and can be reduced insofar as we can assume that the integrated 
development of the region will contribute to the achievement of 
this objective. 
But apart from these reservations, it is clear that in order to 
deal with this major problem the existing concern must first be 
translated into effective decisions, while traditional policy on 
income redistribution must be radically changed so as to ensure 
that a suitable approach to the type of abject poverty found in 
Latin America is adopted. 
In order to translate the existing concern into effective deci-
sions, the social achievements of the current growth styles 
adopted in the region must first be evaluated in the light of 
consumption, production, technological or educational patterns. 
Only such a general approach to our styles of development will 
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enable us to understand why, although we have created a society 
much richer in material goods and services, and with greater 
ability to grow through more rational and efficient economical 
policies, we have nevertheless failed to find an adequate answer to 
the problems of abject poverty. 
Moreover, the prevailing system in the region has shown signs 
of being played out on the economic side. The main dynamism or 
driving force of the economic system has in the past fundamental-
ly been the consumption of high and middle income groups of 
society. This has its limits, however, and tends to dry up. 
The incorporation of the masses in the production and con-
sumption process is bound to establish a new dynamism with side 
and cumulative effects on the system as a whole. And it is this 
incorporation of the poor in the production process which will 
help to solve a social and economic problem. This is the major 
challenge to each society and each country, taken separately and 
from the point of view of its own domestic policy options. 
To make a radical transformation in traditional income distri-
bution policies means to accept that the conventional policies of 
mere distribution of the product are not sufficient to reach to the 
lowest strata of the social spectrum. New policies which adopt a 
special approach are required, and among these the most urgent 
are those connected with the agricultural sector. 
The greatest poverty of the region is concentrated in the Latin 
American agricultural sector. Moreover, there is no doubt that 
this sector has great potential for productive expansion and the 
growing of staple foods. Bringing Latin American agriculture up 
to higher levels than those traditionally achieved would be a 
means of attacking one of the most obvious strongholds of mass 
poverty, by incorporating this sector in the productive process 
not as an act of charity but because of its productive efforts. 
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III 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION: NEED FOR AND GROWING 
VIABILITY OF THIS OBJECTIVE 
It is superfluous to repeat what has already been said and written 
on the imperative reasons for regional integration. What we 
should emphasize here is that the need for agreements and com-
plementarity in Latin America is greater now than ever, and that 
the possibilities of achieving these aims are also greater at this 
time: certainly much greater than when our integration projects 
were first designed. 
First, there is the need, in view of the external situation, to 
find new forms and more successful levels of regional integration 
in order to offset the possible drop in the dynamism of interna-
tional trade as a result of the flagging expansion of the central 
economies. Each Latin American country can find in its own 
region wider markets for its non-traditional exports and sources 
of supply for its import needs. All this —let us repeat— without 
prejudice to the opportunities offered in this connexion by coun-
tries outside the region and particularly the industrialized 
countries. 
Secondly, the possibilities and viability of this objective are 
clear, in view of the larger size and greater diversification of the 
Latin American economic spectrum. Although in the mid-1950s 
—when the integration projects were launched— the productive 
structures perhaps lagged behind the possibilities opened up, the 
present situation is quite different, and the actual facilities are 
fully in keeping with these objectives. 
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that the political, institu-
tional, and cultural conditions —and the image of integration 
31 
itself— have changed radically in favour of the Latin American 
project. 
This conviction does not underestimate existing difficulties, 
nor the disappointment of some who believed that the road 
would be more rapid and direct. These factors, however, do not 
diminish its importance vis-à-vis the incidence of the 
circumstances described. 
It is not possible to go into details about what should be done, 
but some of the substantial principles of the integration strategy 
may be recalled here and now, in particular the criteria of 
reciprocity: namely, that all should participate in and benefit 
from the process, although of course some countries will natural-
ly play a more important role than others in integration or 
outside of it for various well-known reasons. 
As we have seen above, the prospects of dynamic development 
in the next decade provide opportunities for all our economies. 
The problem is to identify and link them. From this standpoint, 
it seems fitting for me to recall what Dr. Prebisch said some time 
ago during the early stages of the integration efforts. Returning 
from a visit to the region, he said: "I found great enthusiasm 
everywhere about the possibilities of exporting to the region, but 
not much was said about importing from the region." 
Let us admit it: a kind of mercantilist attitude continues to 
persist. Indeed, it even has some aggravating factors, since there is 
certainly no lack of persons who would like to increase their sales 
within Latin America, but use their earnings to buy outside Latin 
America. 
We have already said, and we repeat, that the extra-regional 
market will continue to be indispensable for our countries. There 
is not the slightest doubt, however, that export and import flows 
within the region must be brought into some kind of equilibrium 
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—not necessarily country by country and year by year, but on the 
whole or in the context of sub-regional agreements. 
This brings us to the need for creating, expanding or activating 
adequate financial machinery for these increased trade flows. I 
shall come back to this point later with some specific proposals 
on this and other matters. 
What could the new lines for the expansion of regional inte-
gration be? 
The industrial expansion described above contains sizeable 
gaps. The most obvious of these are to be found in some dynamic 
sectors, particularly capital and intermediate goods and chemical 
products, which are lagging far behind. 
It is very important to note that if the regional production 
process does not make progress the goods which at present 
account for 65 per cent of Latin America's industrial imports will 
in ten years' time account for 75 per cent of these imports. There 
is thus a vast area for regional action. 
Why should Latin America not set itself ambitious production 
objectives and develop strong fertilizer, petrochemical, capital 
and intermediate goods industries? What prevents a region which 
has achieved its present levels of development in industry from 
crossing these new frontiers of industrial expansion with the 
valuable assistance of its natural resources, its technical experi-
ence, its human resources and, more recently, its own financial 
resources? 
Flexible agreements and procedures are required to achieve a 
type of industrial development open towards the rest of the 
world but internally integrated so as to increase its efficiency and 
critical mass. The countries should all make the best possible use 
of existing regional integration machinery, suitably revitalized by 
converging agreements between all or some of these countries. 
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Some current endeavours —especially those which have been 
unfolding within the Andean Group— are of special importance in 
this connexion. The need for significant progress in the motor-
vehicle agreement, for example, is not only vital for the advance 
of the Andean industrial process, but also a very important model 
for other major regional endeavours. It is also an extremely 
important stimulus to the hope which the relatively less devel-
oped countries of the region may cherish of really sharing in the 
new international distribution of labour at the regional level. This 
explains the economic and political importance of the agreements 
in progress in the Andean Group, and the interest with which the 
entire region awaits the high-level political decisions which will 
make it possible for the respective agreements to materialize. 
This new concept of regional development, with firmly-based 
integration of the currently incomplete critical sectors of regional 
industry represents one of the main lines for the future expansion 
of Latin America. 
In referring to the high priority of regional integration, I want 
to emphasize the valuable example given in this respect by the 
Caribbean sub-region, which has shown the political decision-
making ability and the economic wisdom to create and set in 
motion such a viable, efficient and dynamic process as 
CARICOM. 
3. 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: A NEW STEP 
TOWARDS A MORE EQUITABLE ECONOMIC ORDER 
Recently, crises in post-war international economic relations, 
developments in the situation of the industrial centres and concern 
about an uncertain future have pointed up the need to review the 
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international economic order and to establish new rules of the 
game. 
The Latin American countries should strive together towards 
that new order, in accordance with their internationalist 
attitude, and should consider their position within it. Of all the 
efforts being made, one is crucial for the developing world and 
for our region in particular, namely the long-standing problem of 
raw materials. 
If the post-war economic order failed from the standpoint of 
the third world, it was because of its inability to solve the 
problem of markets and prices for primary products, which are 
still the mainstay of our exports. No new order can be firmly 
established unless it offers a solution to that problem. 
There are many activities underway or under study at the level 
of the United Nations or of groups of countries such as the 
non-aligned countries. Discussions are underway concerning 
global approaches to the problem —you will remember the recent 
UNCTAD proposal— and operational approaches such as those 
being considered by GATT; protective machinery is being estab-
lished —in the form of producers' associations, for example— and 
the idea has been mooted that a primary products bank should be 
set up. 
All these steps should lead to significant changes in the way 
these problems are dealt with. We believe that this awareness not 
only exists in the under-developed countries but has also emerged 
in the developed countries. It is therefore necessary to adopt a 
new and realistic approach to the problem. 
In view of the relevance of this subject to the short and 
long-term development of Latin America —and if governments so 
desire— ECLA could make an immediate contribution by organ-
izing a meeting in the latter half of the year to discuss at the 
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technical level both the problems concerning primary products of 
particular interest to the region and possible alternative solutions 
to those problems, and possible ways of dealing with the balance-
of-payments difficulties caused in Latin American countries by 
the fluctuation of these exports. 
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PROBLEMS AND IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS OF THE REGION 
The problems mentioned above and some of the broad lines of a 
long-term strategy discussed earlier come up against one practical 
and awkard fact the gloomy prospects of the region's external 
sector over the next few years. 
The reports submitted by the secretariat show that recent 
years witnessed extraordinary trends in the region's balance of 
payments: exports rose, not so much in physical quantity but as a 
result of better prices; the balance of payments was affected by a 
large inflow of external resources which financed a considerable 
deficit in the trade balance, and there was an exceptional boom in 
non-traditional exports. 
The export euphoria and higher prices made possible a corre-
spondingly spectacular surge in imports. Unimpeded development 
could thus take place. In recent years, each unit of growth in 
output required an increase in imports between 1.2 and 1.9 times 
as much, according to the country. The higher per capita income 
of Latin America is changing the structure of demand, and this 
increases the need for imported intermediate and capital goods. 
The lack of industrialization in the region, which is lagging behind 
in the production of these goods, means that more imports are 
needed. Even though there may be a margin of compression, the 
expansion of the domestic product will continue to depend 
mainly on a steady and more than proportional increase in 
imports. 
But the export euphoria is over now. As the secretariat 
pointed out at the time, the recent boom in the external sector 
has to be treated with some scepticism. In many instances, there 
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was merely a nominal increase in the value of exports, which was 
accounted for by the higher cost of imports and offset the drop 
in the purchasing power of certain hard currencies. 
The fact is that those who believed that the problems of the 
external sector had been solved have come to see the situation 
drastically reversed in recent months. The well-known problem of 
terms of trade has returned with a vengeance: while the prices of 
the vast majority of our primary export products are rapidly 
declining, the large industrial centres are transferring their domes-
tic inflation to our countries by pushing up the cost of the goods 
they export to us. The figures speak for themselves and are a 
cause for serious alarm, especially as the situation is getting 
worse. 
In the non-oil-exporting countries of the region, the trade 
balance deficit rose from a little over 600 million dollars in 1973 
to about, 8,700 million dollars in 1974. If the net payment of 
interest and dividends on foreign investment and other non-factor 
services is added, the total balance-of-payments deficit on current 
account amounted to 13,000 million dollars in 1974, more than 
half the value of exports. In some cases, the deficit was well over 
half the value of the country's exports —an indication of the 
magnitude and gravity of the problem. 
At the same time, the accumulated external debt continues to 
have serious repercussions on the balance of payments and to 
absorb a large share of export earnings. 
It can be assumed that balance-of-payments problems wül 
become increasingly serious in 1975 and 1976. Some people 
forecast new increases in the prices of certain products following 
the refloating of the industrial economies and the contained 
demand for some products. Nobody, however, expects a period 
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of sustained improvement in the terms of trade in the medium 
term. 
ECLA estimates for 1975 indicate that the trade deficits of 
most non-oil-exporting Latin American countries will range in 
value between 30 and 100 per cent of exports. This alone shows 
how serious the problems ahead of us are. 
In almost every country in the region, a high growth rate of 
imports must be maintained at least in the medium term, to 
sustain a domestic growth rate similar to that recorded in recent 
years. The ability to meet the social requirements of the popula-
tion, employment and the very social and political stability of a 
country ultimately depend on the growth of the product. Hence, 
the importance of the familiar, long-standing problem of the 
external behaviour of the economy, which has arisen once again. 
-In many of our countries, the dilemma is as follows: either 
solutions to the balance-of-payments deficit are found in the next 
few years or the growth rate must be sacrificed. 
Unless appropriate machinery can be found, the region may 
face an extremely frustrating situation: 
• having made a great effort to boost its exports —especially 
non-traditional exports— inadequate prices may force it to 
relinquish its markets or cut back production considerably. 
• having made a similar effort to control its external indebted-
ness by reorganizing the structure and level of the external 
debt, the countries could find themselves obliged to accept 
inorganic and badly-structured debts at a much higher cost to 
the development process. 
If to these problems are added the reappearance of declining 
trends in the prices of primary products, the difficulties experi-
enced in gaining access for such products to the markets of the 
developed countries and the rapid increase in the prices of 
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imports, the outlook is bleak and must continue to be a cause for 
deep concern. 
HOW IS THE IMMEDIATE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS 
PROBLEM TO BE TACKLED? 
First, a warning: there are marked differences among the prob-
lems of the various countries. Some countries are better protected 
than others thanks to their ability to attract external resources in 
the capital markets, or owing to the particularly favourable 
composition of their exports. 
Whatever the short-term solution may be, it soon ceases to be 
a solution and becomes merely a financial illusion unless at the 
same time long-term solutions are devised for the problem of 
primary product prices and the continuing expansion of our 
exports ensured. 
It would be of little value to have recourse to the sedative of 
instant finance unless suitable solutions can be devised at the 
world level to reverse the trend in the terms of trade, and unless 
suitable internal measures are taken to continue the expansion 
and diversification of exports and to absorb the effects of abrupt 
changes in the world economy. 
The reversal of the trend in the terms of trade is a fundamental 
subject of international discussion on this matter. The region 
must become actively mobilized both to hold consultations on 
the protection of its commodities in international markets and to 
participate in the active review of international relations in the 
field of raw materials which we mentioned earlier. 
Each country must also review its domestic policies with a 
view to adopting monetary, fiscal, exchange or production 
policies which incorporate into the domestic system the necessary 
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adjustments stemming from changes in some basic prices in the 
world economy, as in the case of energy products. 
However, in any event, even with such limitations, we believe 
that solutions will have to be found to ensure the protection of 
our rate of expansion through urgent measures aimed at the acute 
balance-of-payments problems which the majority of countries 
will have to face. 
Two suggestions could be studied by Governments with the 
full assistanceECLA can provide in co-óperation with other inter-
national agencies. 
(a) Protection of intra-zonal trade 
A primary preoccupations is that the present imbalances in the 
payments capacity of the region could affect the gains made in 
intra-zonal trade. 
We are faced with a specific situation. With all its ups-and-
downs, intra-zonal trade has reached high levels in certain items 
which could be affected by direct or indirect payment restric-
tions. 
We believe that it would be very regrettable if this should 
occur, thereby aggravating the difficulties and the problems of 
the external sector of our economies. 
There is some intra-zonal trade which cannot be diverted to 
other regions and can only take place through the existing mar-
keting channels in the region. This is true of trade in some 
agricultural products and more particularly of non-traditional 
manufactures which in recent years have found a ready regional 
market. 
The time is ripe not only for suitable consultations between 
Governments but also for the expansion and substantial improve-
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ment of the payments and supporting machinery for dealing with 
transitory liquidity difficulties, provided for in the multilateral 
compensatory agreement on reciprocal balances and credits and 
in the Santo Domingo Agreement. 
Our region is fortunate in having these financial instruments, 
but undoubtedly it would be an advantage at this time of short-
term balance-of-payments needs to consider new possibilities of 
increasing their scope and making their form of operation more 
flexible. 
fb) The establishment of a "safety net" as a form of protection 
against possible balance-of-payments crises in the 
countries of the region 
The establishment of a regional safety net to provide an alert for 
the imminent balance-of-payment crises could prove to be in the 
common interests of both the countries of the region and the 
international community, particularly the industrialized countries 
which maintain close trade and financial relations with Latin 
America. 
From the standpoint of the region, the establishment of 
special machinery, in the present circumstances, seems to be fully 
justified: the international compensatory financing machinery to 
offset losses in income from reductions in export earnings was 
conceived to cope with situations limited in scope and duration 
which differ from the present one. 
At present, it is to be feared, and with good reason, that the 
reduction in such earnings will in many cases last for several years 
and that the factors responsible for this reduction are such that 
they will affect many products and many Latin American 
countries. 
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" The private external financial markets are not displaying the 
aggressivity and fluidity characteristic of the early years of the 
decade. Faced with new uncertainties and risks, the markets 
are today reviewing their earlier growth and the structure and 
composition of their assets and liabilities. As our countries' 
debt capacity tends to deteriorate as a result of the balance-
of-payments crisis and the increased debt burden, obstacles to 
a substantial financial flow which could alleviate the present 
situation, at least in the foreseeable future, begin to emerge. It 
is paradoxical that Latin American countries should obviously 
be in need of external financing just when their credit worth-
iness is increasingly restricting the possibilities of obtaining it. 
D Official economic assistance to the region has been declining in 
recent years, and it is not to be expected that the atmosphere 
of international economic recession will provide an incentive 
for such assistance or for actual direct foreign investment. 
The very nature of the problem requires a multi-faceted 
solution, covering trade, trade financing granted for various 
periods, financing on concessional terms, access to foreign capital 
markets and investment. 
No less important are domestic and regional efforts in the 
terms described above. 
The traditional multi-faceted approaches do not appear to be 
sufficient in view of the magnitude and acuteness of the problem, 
and efforts to find solutions based on regional co-operation and 
assistance from all disposed to provide it would therefore appear 
to be in the direct interest of the region in the immediate future. 
But it is also of interest to the international community to 
seek solutions which minimize the need to reduce Latin American 
imports, and which will therefore contribute to financing them 
on terms consistent with the nature of the problem, its duration 
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and the overall external payments situation of the countries 
affected. 
It is for this reason that mention was made above of the 
importance of Latin America's purchasing power in international 
markets. It is not only in the interest of Latin America but also in 
the interest of its traditional suppliers to maintain this power. 
The convergence of interests could open the way to joint 
examination of co-operation aimed at a new approach to the 
overall external payments situation of the countries affected. 
A collective safety net comprising a special compensatory 
financing fund for the countries of the region would make it 
possible to meet those requirements. 
With regional and extra-regional contributions, the fund would 
be in a position to give assistance to Latin American countries 
requiring assistance and desirous of applying for it. The adminis-
tration of the fund, which could be made the responsibility of 
some of the existing bodies with experience in this field, should 
be simple. It would operate on as automatic a basis as possible, as 
regards both drafts and payments, although some assessment 
would inevitably have to be made of each specific case. 
The terms, magnitude and repayment periods of the loans 
could take into account the danger that the serious situation 
might persist for some years and the need for the borrowing 
countries to adopt the necessary internal measures to make the 
best possible use of the resources obtained. 
Thus financing would not be a mechanism for delaying the 
necessary process of adjustment but would, on the contrary, 
facilitate a smooth and longer-term adjustment. 
The nature, magnitude and persistence of the problem and the 
possible solutions which could be proposed fully justify the 
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region's making a special effort, to be carried out jointly with the 
countries that have trade relations with it. 
The exact figures for financial requirements should naturally 
be based on precise studies carried out with the participation of 
the appropriate international and regional agencies. However, it 
can be assumed that the safety net should amount approximately 
to at least 4,000 million dollars. This figure represents about 
one-third of the average balance-of-payments deficit on current 
account of the non-oil-exporting countries of Latin America 
according to provisional ECLA estimates for the period 
1974-1976. 
This figure of 4,000 million dollars also represents half of the 
increase in the balance-of-payments deficit of those countries for 
1973 —the last year before the abrupt change in the international 
economic system— and the average for the three-year period 
1974-1976. 
A special meeting on the region's export earnings and raw 
materials would be the proper place to tackle the many facets of 
the problem, and to study and agree on the features of a special 
fund such as that proposed, as well as other possible solutions, all 
of which would go to make up the collective safety net which our 
region requires. 
This kind of solution, adapted to our situation and geared to 
the nature of our problems, would help to maintain the pace of 
world economic activity at the level of our potential and would 
be a further step in addition to those already planned by the 
developed countries along with some developing countries, to 
meet conjunctural situations. 
Although our region anticipates serious difficulties in financing 
recent high levels of imports, it is equally true that it is in the 
interest of the industrialized economies that this problem be 
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solved as one of the means of reactivating their growth rates and 
easing their balance-of-payments situations. It should not be 
forgotten that Latin America is importing goods worth more than 
30,000 million dollars each year. To maintain or increase this 
figure through a forward-looking policy which includes the afore-
mentioned safety net would not only benefit Latin American 
growth but also lead to an expansion of the trade of the countries 
with which this region maintains close economic relations. 
The principal role of EC LA consists precisely in anticipating 
the problems and helping to find solutions. That is why we are 
submitting these ideas for international and regional co-operation. 
We ought not to forget that a distinctive feature of EC LA is 
that it is a regional institution and also part of a global system. 
Finally, in guise of general conclusions, I should like to set out 
some general opinions which sum up my ideas on the present 
occasion. 
• No action should be undertaken at the regional or interna-
tional level without a clear idea of the major changes which 
have taken place in the region in recent years. These changes 
have created a picture of Latin America in its economic, social 
and political aspects, which is far more complex and 
chequered than at the end of the 1960s. Any attempt to 
interpret Latin America's current phenomena by applying 
categories or concepts from the 1950s is liable to deteriorate 
into an ingenuous or irresponsible simplification. 
• If the situation as a whole has changed, its individual compo-
nents have done so even more. Each country today constitutes 
an independent situation which must be analysed in a particu-
lar context. Although the common denominators cannot be 
ignored, to make general proposals without examining each 
particular case may be equally unrealistic or perilous. 
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It is true that there has been a major deployment of the 
productive forces of the region and tremendous progress in 
producing goods. Social contrasts, however, have been aggra-
vated to a perilous extent. This is even more painful when one 
is perfectly well aware that the region is capable of solving 
these problems within the lifetime of the present generation 
by means of structural changes and adequate policies. This is 
the major challenge facing us, that of achieving a better and 
fairer society on a basis of greater solidarity for the great 
masses of Latin America who today are shut away from 
progress and social and economic participation. 
Today, as in the past, the region cannot dissassociate itself 
from what is happening in the rest of the world. The well 
known relationship between the centres and the periphery 
adopted by EC LA as an analytical category for getting to 
know and interpretating many of our problems is more rele-
vant today than ever. The degree of our interdependence with 
the rest of the world has increased, and this means that 
knowing what is going on in the world, and being acquainted 
with the changes in the setting of our international relations is 
basic for our inclusion in the rules of the game, many of which 
are imposed on us by international relationships. 
We must beware of analyses which, by investigating the past, 
attempt to anticipate the future with wild predictions. If the 
decade just elapsed has taught us anything, it is that we should 
be mistrustful of imaginative extrapolations and excessive 
generalizations, and of verborrhea and the absence of down-
to-earth action. The world has entered a period —perhaps a 
long one— of groping in the dark and improvisation. This is the 
most notable feature of these times of economic, social and 
political upheavals. In the face of such a situation, we are 
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convinced that what is needed is considerable flexibility in 
order to adapt to changing circumstances, and a more down-
to-earth pragmatism. 
• None of this should allow us to lose sight of the urgent need to 
reform the existing international order by means of structural 
changes in international relations, and in the rules of the game 
which make for unjust relations among nations. A first 
endeavour to lay the moral bases for this change was the 
Charter of Rights and Duties of States. Now we have to apply 
its principles. Not only is this task not an easy one, but it will 
not be brief. Latin America has the obligation and the respon-
sibility of playing an active role, going beyond the stages of 
denunciation, which are doubtless necessary, but an inade-
quate lead into action. The possibility of action is right there 
in the different fora, up against the different situations 
requiring a solution. 
I have great faith in the capability of the region as a united 
whole to undertake the stages of co-operation and collaboration 
which will open new horizons to Latin America. Suffice it to 
recall some initiatives recently elaborated by some countries in 
the region to illustrate the great capacity, imagination and politi-
cal valour of our countries, which are adopting forms of co-
operation which a few years ago were unimaginable. I believe that 
this is within our grasp for the most part, if we can count on the 
necessary political decision-making. In the face of the problems 
already referred to, we should not be considering our relative role 
in the world order nor our weak bargaining position. For the 
most part, the region has the solutions in its own hands. At a time 
when many of the development strategies applied in recent years 
will be put to the test, regional co-operation may be an answer 
and a major challenge. This is the purpose behind the appeals and 
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the ideas which we have referred to in the present statement with 
the simple aim of stimulating reflexion and action. 
Finally, the analysis of past achievements should not lead us to 
a simplistic complacency with what has been achieved, nor should 
present action submerge us in an unimaginative involvement with 
the immediate present without long-term objectives. 
The flexibility and pragmatism required at the present mo-
ment for our navigation in troubled waters should not reduce our 
capacity to continue questioning our development models and 
putting forward projects for a better society. 
We should therefore continue to establish clear images of 
the Latin American society we want to build up, of what its 
permanent values should be and the best means of consolidating 
and strengthening the relations of equity and justice which are 
the values cherished by the Latin American society since its 
independence. 
ECLA expresses a sincere hope of finding in the deliberations 
of the Sixteenth Session new mandates and new lines of action 
for co-operating with the member Governments with a view to 
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